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FUNDING ENTREPRENEURIAL 
VENTURES IN CHINA: PROPOSALS TO 
MORE EFFECTIVELY REGULATE 
CHINESE FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS 
“Laws are useless when men are pure, unenforceable when 
men are corrupt.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
ver the past thirty years, the People’s Republic of China 
has emerged into an economic juggernaut.2 China has 
leveraged its population of 1.3 billion people3 to industrialize at 
an incredible rate.4 Three decades of 9 percent average annual 
growth in gross domestic product (“GDP”)5 resulted in China 
supplanting Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 
2010.6 Moreover, by focusing on infrastructure spending and 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Chinese proverb. 
 2. See, e.g., Fan Gang, China’s Economic Growth in a Context of Globali-
zation, 7 ASIE VISIONS (Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, 
France), July 2008, at 3, available at 
http://www.ifri.org/downloads/AV7_FanGang_US.pdf; Gordon G. Chang, Chi-
na After 30 Years of Reform, FORBES (Dec. 16, 2008), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/16/china-economic-reform-oped-
cx_gc_1216chang.html; Graeme Wearden, Chinese Economic Boom Has Been 
30 Years in the Making, GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/aug/16/chinese-economic-boom. 
 3. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EAST & 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: CHINA, (2011), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html 
[hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK] (follow “Download Publication” hyperlink). 
Data accurate as of July 2011. Id. 
 4. China’s economy today is ninety times larger than it was in 1978. Kev-
in Hamlin & Li Yanping, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest 
Economy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-
08-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-
rise.html. 
 5. Zuliu Hu & Mohsin S. Khan, Why Is China Growing So Fast?, 8 ECON. 
ISSUES (Int’l Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1997, at 1, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues8/issue8.pdf. 
 6. Becoming Number One: China’s Economy Could Overtake America’s 
Within a Decade, ECONOMIST (Sept. 24, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21528987 [hereinafter Becoming Number 
One]. 
O
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the export of consumer goods to drive economic growth,7 China 
has managed to largely avoid the financial turmoil that has 
roiled developed economies, particularly the United States and 
the European Union, since late 2007.8 
The vibrancy of China’s economy has led to the emergence of 
a middle class and a generation of “budding entrepreneurs”9 
who seek to build new businesses and raise capital.10 Western 
investors have been eager to seek investment opportunities in 
these fast-growing Chinese businesses11 and to enter a market 
that, a generation ago, was off-limits to outsiders.12 Foreign in-
vestment in Chinese firms, however, has been plagued with 
problems.13 Regulators have discovered numerous instances of 
corruption and fraud, often perpetrated through deceptive ac-
counting practices, within Chinese companies publicly listed in 
the United States.14 These revelations have resulted in interna-
tional finger pointing between the United States Securities and 
                                                                                                                                     
 7. Colin Speakman, China Must Be Cautious in Raising Consumption, 
CHINA DAILY (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008-
11/21/content_7228346.htm. 
 8. China is “basically carrying the world economy.” Kenneth Rapoza, 
What’s So Great About China?, FORBES (July 31, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/07/31/whats-so-great-about-
china. While the rest of the world struggles, China’s economy is projected to 
grow by 9.1% in 2011, down from 10.5% in 2010. Id.; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra 
note 3. 
 9. David Barboza, Attention Shifts to China for Private Equity Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at B1. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Peter Fuhrman, How Big Can the PE Industry in China 
Grow?, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/263654-how-big-can-the-pe-industry-in-china-
grow (citing a McKinsey & Company study finding that private equity capital 
flowing into private Chinese companies could reach thirty billion dollars in 
the next five years). 
 12. See generally David Finn, Peering over the Great Wall: Extraterritorial 
Securities Regulation and U.S. Investment in China’s State Owned-Banks, 7 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 277, 281–82 (2006) (describing how the opening of Chi-
na’s financial market has attracted interest from U.S. investors). 
 13. Id. at 286. 
 14. Markets in China Are Barely Fazed by Scandal, Unless the State Is 
Involved, ECONOMIST (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21526407 [hereinafter Markets in China]. 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the China Securities Regu-
latory Commission.15 
This Note explores the issues raised by such tainted firms 
and suggests policy changes that may result in more effective 
regulation of Chinese public companies. Specifically, this Note 
argues that by implementing legislation that mirrors provi-
sions of the United States’ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, China 
may be able to develop and, more importantly, enforce a strict-
er regulatory regime that will reduce corporate fraud. Part I of 
this Note provides an overview of the Chinese economy’s tran-
sition from an inward, state-controlled system to a global pow-
er. Part II describes the opportunities attracting Western in-
vestors to China and the advantages to Chinese business of 
seeking Western capital. Part III outlines the deficiencies of 
the current Chinese regulatory system and reviews several re-
cent transactions that have failed due to its insufficiency. Fi-
nally, Part IV suggests a regulatory framework that will allow 
Chinese businesses to access the Western capital markets 
while assuring investors that the companies are making fully 
honest and transparent disclosures. 
I. THE RISE OF CHINA 
A. The Centralized Economy 
One of the most remarkable aspects of China’s rise to the 
global economic stage is the speed with which it occurred.16 Fol-
lowing the ascendency of the Communist Party of China 
(“CPC”) in 1949,17 Chairman Mao Zedong instituted a series of 
reforms that sought to institute a command economy in China 
similar to that of the Soviet Union.18 The government seized 
                                                                                                                                     
 15. William Pentland, Deloitte Squeezed by SEC, Chinese Regulators, 
FORBES (Sept. 10, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/09/10/deloitte-squeezed-by-
sec-chinese-regulators. 
 16. See William I. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent 
Conflict Between China’s Communist Politics and Capitalistic Securities 
Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (2002). 
 17. Id. at 477. 
 18. Todd Kennith Ramey, China: Socialism Embraces Capitalism? An Ox-
ymoron for the Turn of the Century: A Study of the Restructuring of the Secu-
rities Markets and Banking Industry in the People’s Republic of China in an 
Effort To Increase Investment Capital, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 451, 453–54 
(1998). See Friedman, supra note 16, at 477. 
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control over land ownership and implemented harsh re-
strictions on human rights and business policies.19 In 1953, all 
private businesses officially came under state control.20  The 
economy became centrally planned and rapidly focused on 
manufacturing and industry. 21  However, this approach had 
many disadvantages that ultimately suppressed growth22 and 
China morphed into a “dormant economic giant.”23 
B. The Beginnings of a Privatized Economy 
Following Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping came to power and, in 
1978, began a series of major economic reforms known as the 
“Open-Door Policy.”24 The Open-Door Policy advocated the use 
of “market mechanisms and foreign resources . . . to speed up 
the growth and modernization of the economy.”25 These reforms 
were a stark departure from the rigid planning of the command 
economy under Mao and generally followed a theme of “mar-
ket-oriented socialism.” 26  The new economic plan included 
banking and securities market reforms as well as a strengthen-
ing of the national economy by providing both domestic and 
foreign investment capital to Chinese industries.27 
“Limited privatization”28  was an important part of Deng’s 
Open-Door Policy and was promoted by the Chinese govern-
                                                                                                                                     
 19. Ramey, supra note 18, at 454. Mao theorized that “this type of planned 
economy would result in maximum productivity and efficiency, since the en-
tire population would be employed for the good of the country.” Friedman, 
supra note 16, at 477. 
 20. China 1949 to 1953, HIST. LEARNING SITE, 
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/china_1949_to_1953.htm (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2012). 
 21. Ramey, supra note 18, at 454. 
 22. Id. “[The] state-run economy produced few incentives for its people to 
pursue operational efficiency, and no accountability for the profits or losses of 
their businesses. As a result, the Chinese economy generated massive waste 
and losses.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 477. 
 23. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 1. 
 24. Ramey, supra note 18, at 456. 
 25. Id. Deng Xiaoping characterized his reforms as “socialism with Chi-
nese characteristics.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 478. 
 26. Ramey, supra note 18, at 456–62 (describing “market-oriented social-
ism” as a mixture of capitalist notions and social ideals). 
 27. Id. at 456. 
 28. “Limited privatization” refers to “minority private equity participation 
in state-owned enterprises so as to enable the government to retain majority 
control of the market.” Friedman, supra note 16, at 478. 
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ment as a means to attract capital into the economy.29 By pri-
vatizing some industries, the government was able to sell its 
stake to private interests while using the proceeds to reinvest 
capital into the economy.30 The state still retained a controlling 
interest in the “privatized” entity, however.31 The concept of 
“limited privatization” thus allowed the government to achieve 
two objectives.32 First, the government was able to infuse capi-
tal into the economy, thereby promoting growth.33 Second, the 
government was able to retain a position in these “privatized” 
businesses to promote its socialist agenda and goals,34 while 
retaining full control of select industries such as the media.35 
By achieving these two feats, “limited privatization” set the 
stage for China’s economic renaissance.36 
C. A Global Economic Power 
The results of China’s economic reform were rapid.37 Since 
1978, when Deng Xiaoping removed hard-line Communist poli-
cies and began to promote the free-market, China’s economy 
has increased in size ninety times over.38 During this time, 
China has seen an average growth of more than 9 percent per 
year, with several peak years exceeding 13 percent growth in 
                                                                                                                                     
 29. Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and the Creation of Stock Compa-
nies in China, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 305. The CPC’s initiative has 
been so successful that China now ranks second to the United States in terms 
of inflows of foreign direct investment. Friedman, supra note 16, at 478. 
 30. Ramey, supra note 18, at 462. 
 31. Id. Some sectors of the economy were never subject to “limited privati-
zation.” See id. at 464; Rick Carew, New Rules for Private Equity Investors in 
China, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2010, 8:25 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/01/18/new-rules-for-private-equity-investors-
in-china. These included any enterprises involved with defense, mining, tele-
vision or publishing, each deemed to be an industry of “strategic value” to the 
government. Id. 
 32. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 478–79. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. The percentage of this controlling interest held by the state gener-
ally varies from 51-80% for exchange-listed companies. Ramey, supra note 18, 
at 463. 
 35. Ramey, supra note 18, at 464; Carew, supra note 31. 
 36. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 479. 
 37. See id. 
 38. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. 
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GDP.39 From a broader perspective, the economy has success-
fully transitioned from an agrarian economy into an industrial 
and service-based economy. 40  Three developments—out of 
many more—are particularly illustrative. First, four out of five 
Chinese were employed in agriculture in 1978; by 1994, that 
number dropped to only one in two. 41  Second, four of the 
world’s top ten companies today, as measured by market capi-
talization, are from China.42 Third, in August 2010, Agricultur-
al Bank of China Limited closed the largest initial public offer-
ing ever at $22.1 billion.43 
By focusing on areas like infrastructure spending, China has 
largely avoided the worst of the “Great Recession” that contin-
ues to plague much of the developed world as of mid-2012.44 In 
fact, China’s growth rate in 2009—the very height of the cri-
sis—stood steady at 8.7%.45 Though there may be a number of 
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 1. Before 1978, China saw annual growth 
of about 6 percent per year, but with “painful ups and downs along the way.” 
Id. 
 40. See generally Finn, supra note 12, at 285. See also Hu & Khan, supra 
note 5, at 5 (reciting that the reforms began with the decollectivization of 
agriculture and the development in rural areas of a non-agricultural em-
ployment sector). 
 41. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 5. 
 42. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. These companies are PetroChina 
Company, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Mobile 
Limited, and China Construction Bank Corporation. Id. 
 43. Id. Five years after China’s first state-owned lender went public, the 
country is now home to four of the world’s ten largest banks by market capi-
talization. Id. Throughout this Note, “$” refers to U.S. Dollars unless other-
wise stated. 
 44. Geoff Dyer, China Embarks on Infrastructure Spending Spree, FIN. 
TIMES (June 7, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/dc65a5c8-6fc2-
11df-8fcf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1acBNCaZZ. “New roads have been built 
and gleaming airline terminals constructed, but the biggest emphasis has 
been on rail, especially the rapidly expanding high-speed network. . . . China 
plans to lay 18,640 miles of track by the middle of the decade at a cost of as 
much as Rbm4,000 bn.” Id. China’s economic performance during the Great 
Recession has been described as “the envy of the Western world.” Jeremy 
Page, Many Rich Chinese Consider Leaving, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204394804577011760523331
438.html?mod=WSJ_hp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsTop (describing annual 
GDP growth of 9.1% in the third quarter of 2011 and an International Mone-
tary Fund estimate of 9.5% GDP growth for all of 2011). 
 45. China Economy Shows Strong Growth in 2009, BBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 
2010, 13:14 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8471613.stm. 
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factors for China’s success during the recession, China’s role as 
a “resource vacuum” has played an undeniably important 
role.46 For example, China is the world’s number one buyer of 
iron ore and copper and number two importer of crude oil.47 
With China’s 1.8 billion people, three decades of 9 percent 
average growth in GDP per year, and an apparent immunity to 
the global economic downturn occurring outside of its borders, 
it is unsurprising that China has been quickly ascending the 
International Monetary Fund’s ranking of countries by GDP.48 
China, with a GDP of $5.9 trillion, surpassed Japan in 2010 to 
become the world’s second largest economy.49 In the next dec-
ade, China is projected to overtake the United States and be-
come the largest economy in the world.50 As the United States 
struggles with debt-financing entitlement obligations and na-
tional security, 51  China holds about $1.2 trillion of United 
States Treasury bills,52 making it the largest financier of U.S. 
debt outside of the United States.53 The tremendous invest-
ment China has accumulated in the United States makes cer-
tain that its rise will have a significant impact on the global 
economy going forward. 
                                                                                                                                     
 46. Rapoza, supra note 8. 
 47. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. 
 48. Becoming Number One, supra note 6. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. This determination assumes an average annual growth rate of 2.5% 
for the United States. Id. Depending on the calculation of exchange rates, the 
date could be even sooner. Id. The current calculation using purchasing pow-
er parity, which takes into account the relative cost of goods in the various 
countries, shows that the United States and China are actually very close in 
economic might and that China will overtake the United States by 2016. Id. 
Calculation using current market prices leaves China further behind, though, 
as does any formula involving GDP per person metrics. Id. 
 51. Jack Welch & Suzy Welch, Who Will Rule The 21st Century?, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (July 1, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/perm/content/07_27/b40410889.htm (“If not 
dealt with, entitlements like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will 
create a budget deficit that will explode over the next 20 years.”). 
 52. Tom Murse, How Much U.S. Debt Does China Really Own?, 
ABOUT.COM, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/moneymatters/ss/How-Much-US-
Debt-Does-China-Own.htm (last visited July 15, 2012). This equates to about 
8 percent of publicly-held U.S. debt. Id. China is the third-largest holder, be-
hind the Social Security Trust Fund and the Federal Reserve. Id. 
 53. See Rapoza, supra note 8. 
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II. THE CHINESE ENTREPRENEUR AND WESTERN 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT 
The introduction of “limited privatization” has had two socio-
logical effects on the nation.54 First, market economic policies 
have led to the rise of a large, wealthy middle class.55 Second, 
an entrepreneurial spirit has developed within that middle 
class,56 to which an increasingly educated Chinese populace is 
seeking to cater by using research and technology to develop 
fast-growing new ventures.57 This is a self-perpetuating effect 
that will be central to China’s ability to sustain its incredible 
rate of development.58 
A. The New Middle Class 
Since the state began to move towards “market-oriented” so-
cialism, the United Nations estimates that China has lifted 300 
million of its citizens out of poverty.59 Further, according to the 
World Bank, China’s poverty rate has gone from 6% in 1996 to 
2.8% in 2004.60 Presently, China’s middle class consists of 300 
million people, or approximately 25% of the population.61 Ac-
                                                                                                                                     
 54. See, e.g., Kenneth Rapoza, Two Funds To Profit off China’s Growing 
Middle Class, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2011, 3:43 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/03/30/if-chinas-middle-class-is-
growing-richer-why-cant-we; Linda Yueh, China’s Entrepreneurs, 
CENTREPIECE, Spring 2008, at 15, available at 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp253.pdf. 
 55. Rapoza, supra note 54. 
 56. Yueh, supra note 54, at 15–18. 
 57. See Kathrin Hille, China Searches for the Next Steve Jobs, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 21, 2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/7621faf6-fad5-11e0-8fe7-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1hFOuCSNA. 
 58. Simeon Djankov et al., Who Are China’s Entrepreneurs?, CEPR Discus-
sion Paper no. 5706, CTR. FOR ECON. POL. RES., June 2006, available at 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/AERChina.pdf. 
 59. Hamlin & Yanping, supra note 4. “The country remains a developing 
nation, with its per capita gross national income ranked 127th in the world . . 
. behind Angola and Azerbaijan, according to the World Bank.” Id. The large 
size of China’s population, however, does not work to its benefit when meas-
uring that metric. Id. 
 60. Rapoza, supra note 54. 
 61. Peter Ford, In China, Middle-Class Affluence, Not Political Influence, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 20, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/0520/In-China-
middle-class-affluence-not-political-influence. This figure is projected to dou-
ble by 2025, according to a study by McKinsey & Company. Id. 
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cording to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, families 
with assets valued from RMB150,000 ($18,137) to RMB300,000 
($36,275) are to be classified as middle class.62 This middle 
class is composed of “a range of different sorts of white-collar 
people—entrepreneurs, employees of large state-owned enter-
prises and multinational companies, CPC officials, lawyers, 
doctors, and teachers.”63 The ascent of this middle class may 
perhaps be most clear when considering that many children of 
parents who were assigned manual labor jobs by the CPC a 
generation ago now work at start-up companies.64 The philoso-
phy of the new Chinese middle class is that money may be the 
only possible means of achieving personal autonomy in a nation 
where political freedoms are still very restrained.65 
B. The Chinese Entrepreneur 
Entrepreneurism in China has been a catalyst for the na-
tion’s economic growth since the late 1990s.66 Rising expecta-
tions and the constant drive for money has driven a new gener-
ation of Chinese, many of whom were not even born at the time 
of the 1978 reforms, to become entrepreneurs.67 The reforms 
under Deng Xiaoping and the Open-Door Policy granted great-
er autonomy to enterprise managers,68 allowing them to truly 
control their businesses by pricing goods at competitive levels, 
hiring efficient workers and firing inefficient workers, and re-
                                                                                                                                     
 62. Xin Zhigang, Dissecting China’s ‘Middle Class’, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 27, 
2004), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
10/27/content_386060.htm. While these numbers may seem low, it is im-
portant to remember the purchasing power parity discrepancy between China 
and Western nations, as well as China’s per capita GDP rests around $2000. 
Gang, supra note 2, at 10. Throughout this Note, “RMB” refers to Chinese 
Renminbi unless otherwise stated. 
 63. Ford, supra note 61. 
 64. See, e.g., id. (describing the youngest generation of Chinese as being 
able to afford luxuries, such as cars and vacations, which were unknown to 
their parents’ generation). 
 65. Id. One “middle class” woman interviewed for the article stated her 
belief in the power of money to ensure well-being. Id. As an example, she cit-
ed the tainted infant milk scandal of 2008, where over 12,000 babies were 
poisoned by adulterated milk. Id. Middle class families, she says, were able to 
afford imported baby formula. Id. 
 66. Yueh, supra note 54, at 15. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that 
there were 40 million small- and medium-sized enterprises in China. Id. 
 67. See generally id. at 15–18. 
 68. Hu & Khan, supra note 5, at 5. 
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taining corporate earnings for future investment.69 These en-
terprises have developed new products, created jobs, paid tax-
es, and have “g[iven] the national economy a flexibility and re-
siliency” that was absent under Mao’s leadership.70 As the CPC 
relinquishes its control of business, the emergence of entrepre-
neurs has “transformed the economy into one increasingly 
driven by competition, innovation and productivity,”71 resulting 
in private company growth of over 30 percent per year.72 
A major challenge faced by those seeking to start their own 
businesses in China has been access to credit.73 It is estimated 
that less than 0.5 percent of Chinese small- and medium-sized 
businesses can obtain loans from local banks.74 Chinese banks, 
despite the “limited privatization” movement, remain state-
owned and prefer to issue credit to “politically favored govern-
ment companies.”75 In addition, seed investment capital, money 
typically available in mature markets to fund start-up ven-
tures, is almost non-existent in China.76 To some extent, this 
unwillingness to lend reflects a more conservative Chinese in-
vestment philosophy.77 Chinese venture capitalists, a nascent 
industry itself,78 prefer companies with fully developed prod-
                                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Yueh, supra note 54, at 18. 
 72. Fuhrman, supra note 11 (“[These companies] have the scale, experi-
ence, management and market leadership to continue to double in size every 
two to three years.”). 
 73. Yueh, supra note 54, at 16. 
 74. Id. A survey shows that only 7 percent of entrepreneurs have adequate 
funding to capitalize their businesses. Id. 
 75. Joe McDonald, China Promises More Loans for Small Companies, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2011/10/12/china_promises_more_loa
ns_for_small_companies. Approximately 70 percent of bank loans finance 
companies controlled by the state, despite the fact that the state sector pro-
duces only 34 percent of total industrial output. Ramey, supra note 18, at 
483. 
 76. China’s Emerging Venture Capital Opportunities, ESCAPEARTIST.COM, 
http://www.escapeartist.com/OREQ29/Chinas_Emerging_Venture_Capital_O
pportunities.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Venture capitalists typically raise funds from institutional investors, 
such as pension funds, endowments, and foundations. FAQ, NAT’L VENTURE 
CAPITAL ASS’N, 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?Itemid=147&id=119&option=com_content&vi
ew=article (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). China currently lacks “experienced pen-
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ucts, a customer base, and a sales history when evaluating an 
investment.79 Because of the unwillingness of banks to lend 
and the absence of early-stage “angel” investors, Chinese busi-
nesses have been forced to turn to a high-interest underground 
credit market akin to loan-sharking.80 
C. Reverse Mergers as a Means to Access the American Capital 
Markets 
Chinese companies seeking a stable source of funding are ea-
ger to bypass the local funding regime entirely.81 These busi-
nesses often seek to access the broad capital markets of the 
United States.82 At the same time, due to China’s confluence of 
a large population, increasingly educated populace, and rising 
standards of living, American investors are eager to provide 
capital to Chinese companies that offer access to the bourgeon-
ing Chinese market.83 The potential for growth investment in 
China is illustrated by the Halter USX CHINA Index,84 which 
posted a gain of 60% in 2009.85 Following the dot-com boom of 
                                                                                                                                     
sion funds and other big institutional investors that provide the backbone of 
private-equity funding in the West.” Carew, supra note 31. 
 79. China’s Emerging Venture Capital Opportunities, supra note 76. 
 80. McDonald, supra note 75. An economist at Credit Suisse recently val-
ued the Chinese “informal lending” market at four trillion yuan ($615 billion) 
and growing at a rate of approximately 50 percent a year. Id. 
 81. Barbarians in Love: Global Private-Equity Firms Are Seduced by the 
China Dream, ECONOMIST (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17580583 [hereinafter Barbarians in Love]. 
 82. Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign 
Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime Is Affecting the United States’ His-
toric Position as the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II, the United States has been the world’s 
principal capital market . . . with substantial retail participation by individu-
al investors and small institutions, plentiful capital for equity financing and 
a willingness to hold long-term debt securities.”). 
 83. Barbarians in Love, supra note 81 (describing China as particularly 
“seductive” for Westerners). 
 84. “The Halter index is composed of U.S.-listed Chinese companies, rang-
ing from the American depositary shares of well-known names like Internet 
giant Baidu.com (ticker: BIDU) and telecom power China Mobile (ticker: 
CHL) to small-cap reverse mergers.” Bill Alpert & Leslie P. Norton, Beware 
This Chinese Export, BARRON’S (Aug. 28, 2010), 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970204304404575449812943
183940.html. 
 85. Id. 
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the early 2000s,86 Western investors have been excited to ex-
plore similar speculation in alternative markets such as Chi-
na.87 
The result of Western investment interest and the Chinese 
desire to access the more developed Western capital markets 
has been the rapid emergence of Chinese companies choosing 
to list their securities on American stock exchanges.88 The most 
common route chosen to list in the United States by these com-
panies has been the reverse merger.89 A reverse merger occurs 
when a private Chinese company is merged into an existing 
American public shell company.90 The American shell compa-
ny’s board resigns, and then the new Chinese board assumes 
control, changes the company’s name, and begins to issue 
                                                                                                                                     
 86. In the 1990s, speculation over new technology, particularly the rise of 
the Internet, led stock market prices to climb rapidly, in what became known 
as the “dot-com boom.” ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 136 (3d ed. 2009). On March 10, 2000, the 
NASDAQ closed at 5,048.62, and the bubble promptly burst. Tony Long, 
March 10, 2000: Pop Goes the NASDAQ!, WIRED (Mar. 10, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2010/03/0310nasdaq-bust. As late as 
March 2010, the NASDAQ remained approximately 50 percent below its all-
time high. Jim Zarroli, A Decade Later, NASDAQ Is Half Its All-Time High, 
NPR (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124537450. 
 87. See Finn, supra note 12, at 285–86. The small business start-up scene 
in China has been described as having a “frenetic feel” to it, similar to the 
dot-com boom days. Ron Gluckman, Seeding China’s Start-Up Scene, With a 
Nod to Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2011, 8:22 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/seeding-chinas-start-up-scene-with-a-
nod-to-silicon-valley. 
 88. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 89. Jamil Anderlini, Investing: Problems Flagged Up, FIN. TIMES (July 4, 
2011, 8:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f5c9c8e-a671-11e0-ae9c-
00144feabdc0.html. 
 90. Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse Merger” 
Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 475, 478 (2006). A shell company is a company 
with no assets, only access to a public market for its securities. Id. For exam-
ple, Chinese medical-device vendor Winner Group merged into Las Vegas 
Resorts, a liquidated American shell company. Alpert & Norton, supra note 
84. Chinese tire maker Zhongsen International merged into Rub A Dub Soap. 
Id. Chinese chemical company Keyuan Petrochemicals merged into Silver 
Pearl, a failing furniture import business based in Rockwall, TX. Walter Pav-
lo, Fraud in Chinese Reverse Mergers on American Exchanges—And We’re 
Surprised?, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2011, 4:50 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/04/08/fraud-in-chinese-reverse-
mergers-on-american-exchanges-and-were-surprised. 
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shares to the public.91 A reverse merger allows a company to 
start accessing the U.S. public markets without going through 
the lengthy initial public offering (“IPO”) formalities controlled 
by the SEC.92 By not having to officially file for an IPO, compa-
nies avoid the legal and auditing fees associated with negotiat-
ing with underwriters.93 More significantly, companies listing 
by reverse merger are not required to file a registration state-
ment for review by the SEC.94 
About 350 Chinese reverse mergers have closed since 2003.95 
Though deals of this nature rarely exceed one billion dollars in 
market capitalization, these 350 transactions have a combined 
capitalization of over fifty billion dollars. 96  Because of this 
strategy, Chinese foreign issuers are able to access American 
capital markets without regulatory review of their disclosure 
and without oversight as to whether their financial statements 
were properly audited.97 In the late 2000s, a combination of 
American regulators, auditors, and activist investors began to 
unveil many Chinese companies listing in the United States as 
frauds, threatening American investors, tarnishing the reputa-
                                                                                                                                     
 91. Bruce Einhorn & Frederik Balfour, Going Public, Chinese Style, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Mar. 5, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_10/b4024067.htm. For 
example, Ticketcart Inc., a defunct online retailer of printer cartridges, was 
merged with Tieli Xiaoxinganlin Frog Breeding Company, a Chinese nutri-
tional supplements retailer, to allow the Chinese company to go public in the 
United States. Id. 
 92. Floyd Norris, The Audacity of Chinese Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 
2011, at B1; Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, CHINA L. & PRAC. 
(Sept. 2, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 18879796. 
 93. Norris, supra note 92. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Francine McKenna, Chinese Reverse Merger Companies: The Auditor 
Angle, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2011/03/15/chinese-reverse-
merger-companies-the-auditor-angle. U.S. federal securities law requires 
publicly registered companies to file financial statements with the SEC that 
are audited by PCAOB-registered auditing firms. Q&A: Small Business and 
the SEC, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). A 
PCAOB study concluded that, following the closing of a reverse merger, the 
shell company’s auditor is frequently dismissed and replaced with the Chi-
nese operating company’s auditor. McKenna, supra note 97. 
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tion of the Chinese economy, and ultimately harming the inter-
ests of Chinese entrepreneurs seeking foreign capital.98 
III. DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHINESE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND 
CORPORATE FRAUD 
Some have described the oversight of “foreign private issu-
ers,” including Chinese companies listed on U.S. securities ex-
changes, as a “regulatory vacuum,”99 with neither the United 
States nor China effectively monitoring those companies that 
list via reverse merger. The lack of oversight has resulted in 
massive losses by international investors, which continue as of 
this writing. This Part describes the current regulation of secu-
rities in the United States and China and the deficiencies that 
the Chinese system faces with regards to enforcement. It then 
provides an explanation for the underperformance of Chinese 
reverse merger listings and the instances of corporate fraud 
that regulators and investors have unveiled. Lastly, this Part 
examines both the current regulatory abyss in which Chinese 
foreign private issuers find themselves and the inability of 
American and Chinese regulators to find compromise. 
A. A Tale of Two Regulatory Regimes 
In the United States, the federal securities laws “establish 
mandatory disclosure of the business and financial conditions 
                                                                                                                                     
 98. It is important to note that many well-established Chinese companies 
list on American exchanges through means other than reverse mergers. Steve 
Dickinson, Thinking Clearly About Chinese Companies Listed on US Stock 
Exchanges. Or, If a Tree Falls in a Sino-Forest . . ., CHINA L. BLOG (July 1, 
2011), 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/thinking_clearly_about_chinese_compa
nies_listed_on_us_stock_exchanges.html. They are typically government-
controlled companies that concurrently trade on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Id. These companies form the heart of the Chi-
nese industrial and service economy. Examples include China Eastern Air-
lines Corporation, China Life Insurance Company Limited, China Mobile, 
and China Unicom. See id. These companies are considered Chinese “blue-
chips” and have not been implicated in any fraudulent activity. See id. Com-
panies pursuing the reverse merger route tend to be small-cap technology 
companies operating under unique structures such as the VIE (variable in-
terest entity). See id. 
 99. Anderlini, supra note 89. 
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of public companies.”100 Congress set forth the regulatory re-
gime for securities issuers primarily through two pieces of leg-
islation that together constitute the U.S. federal securities 
laws: the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).101 
The Securities Act applies to an issuer’s initial offering of se-
curities.102 Domestic companies wishing to issue their securi-
ties to the public must have the approval of the SEC.103 Pro-
spective issuers gain such approval through a multistep pro-
cess, typically beginning with the company filing a registration 
statement on Form S-1104 and disclosing information about the 
issuer, the security offered, and any potential underwriters.105 
Under the Securities Act, companies must make full disclosure 
of all pertinent information to potential investors in the regis-
tration statement.106 Further, the SEC requires that financial 
statements, audited by an independent certified public ac-
countant, accompany the registration statement.107 The regis-
tration statement is reviewed by the SEC and, in the event the 
SEC makes comments about the filing, subsequently revised by 
the issuer.108 Once the SEC fully approves the document, it is 
                                                                                                                                     
 100. James A. Fanto & Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of For-
eign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 51, 53 
(1997). 
 101. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97. 
 102. Fanto & Karmel, supra note 100, at 53. 
 103. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2011) (amended 2012). Compa-
nies cannot offer their securities for sale until the SEC staff declares the 
company’s registration statement “effective.” Q&A: Small Business and the 
SEC, supra note 97. 
 104. All forms are SEC forms unless otherwise stated. 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 77g. 
 106. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97 (defining “full dis-
closure” as “the facts investors would find important in making an invest-
ment decision.”). Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once observed that 
“sunshine is the best disinfectant, electric light the best policeman.” PINTO & 
BRANSON, supra note 86, at 167. One of the main purposes of the “full and fair 
disclosure” philosophy is to prevent fraud by eliminating three mechanisms 
through which fraud manifests itself: “non-disclosure, half-truth, [and] dis-
closure in a misleading way.” Id. at 168. Full and fair disclosure encourages 
efficient public capital markets and protects prospective investors. Pavkov, 
supra note 90, at 496. 
 107. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97. 
 108. Id. 
388 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
declared “effective” and the issuer is free to become a public 
reporting company.109 
The Exchange Act governs the subsequent issuance and trad-
ing of securities by requiring public companies to file timely 
reports with the SEC relating to their ongoing financial per-
formance and operations.110 These reports include an annual 
report with audited financial statements on Form 10-K, as well 
as quarterly reports with unaudited financial statements on 
Form 10-Q and current reports concerning certain episodic 
events on Form 8-K.111 
Compliance with the federal securities laws, particularly the 
initial registration of securities by a new issuer under the Se-
curities Act, entails significant cost.112 Section 11 of the Securi-
ties Act imposes liability upon every person who signed the reg-
istration statement for “any untrue statement of a material 
fact” contained “in any part of the registration statement.”113 
Due to the considerable degree of liability involved, issuers are 
wise to retain legal counsel and an accounting firm that will 
“credibly audit and certify financial statements.”114 
                                                                                                                                     
 109. Marshall Brain, How NASDAQ IPOs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://money.howstuffworks.com/nasdaq-ipo.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012). 
 110. Fanto & Karmel, supra note 100, at 53; Pavkov, supra note 90, at 496. 
 111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2011) (amended 
2012). See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 162–63. Episodic events trig-
gering an 8-K filing include “a change in control, bankruptcy, [and] resigna-
tion or dismissal of the outside auditors . . . .” Id. at 163. 
 112. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 172. Aside from legal expenses, 
fees include auditing expenses, SEC registration fees, and the cost of printing 
copies of the issuer’s prospectus once finalized. Id. 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 77k; PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 171. Section 11 
liability is vast. 
Defendants under [Section 11 of the Securities Act] include the issu-
er, every person who signed the registration statement (the principal 
executive officer, chief financial officer, comptroller or other chief ac-
counting officer, and a majority of directors must sign), every person 
who was a director, those named as becoming a director, and every 
accountant, engineer, appraiser or “other person whose profession 
gives authority to a statement made by him” who “expertises” or cer-
tifies a portion of the registration statement. The issuer is strictly li-
able. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  
 114. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 86, at 171. 
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The accountancy firms reviewing the financial statements of 
public reporting companies in the United States are themselves 
regulated by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”).115 The PCAOB is a nonprofit organization that pro-
vides regulatory oversight to the audits of public companies.116 
The organization seeks to “protect the interests of investors” 
and ensure the dissemination of “informative, accurate and in-
dependent audit reports.”117 The PCAOB was created as part of 
the reforms promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”) in response to a wave of corporate and accounting 
scandals in the United States.118 
China’s securities regulatory regime, particularly with re-
spect to enforcement, is decidedly primitive as compared to 
                                                                                                                                     
 115. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2011). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. The SEC oversees the PCAOB and approves the rules, standards, 
and budget proffered by the PCAOB. About the PCAOB, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. 
OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2012). The PCAOB is funded by annual fees assessed to public re-
porting companies according to their market capitalization. See id. The 
PCAOB is managed by a board appointed to staggered five-year terms by the 
SEC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve and the Secretary of the 
Treasury. See id. Potential sanctions, which the PCAOB may levy on audit 
firms for violations of its standards, include “fines, censures, removal from 
client arrangements, limitations on activities, and suspension from audit 
functions on a temporary or permanent basis.” John Paul Lucci, Enron—The 
Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of Sar-
banes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 223 (2003). 
 118. About the PCAOB, supra note 117. The most prominent of the corpo-
rate and accounting scandals of 2001-02 was the December 2001 collapse of 
Enron. See Lucci, supra note 117, at 211–12 (“Financial scandals involving 
WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron ultimately cost share-
holders $460 billion.”). Enron was a Houston, TX-based corporation engaged 
in energy and commodities trading. Gary M. Cunningham & Jean E. Harris, 
Enron and Arthur Andersen: The Case of the Crooked E and the Fallen A, 3 
GLOBAL PERSP. ON ACCT. EDUC. 27, 31 (2006). Enron was once the seventh 
largest company in the United States by market capitalization. Dan Ackman, 
Enron the Incredible, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2002, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/0115enron.html. Enron’s auditor, Arthur 
Andersen LLP, was considered one of the most prestigious accounting firms 
in the world. Cunningham & Harris, supra note 118, at 31. Enron imploded 
in the fall of 2001 after the revelation of a series accounting irregularities and 
instances of insider trading amongst Enron senior executives. See id. at 34, 
40–44. Arthur Andersen was convicted in June 2002 of obstruction of justice 
for shredding accounting working papers in connection with the Enron audit 
and eventually dissolved. See id. at 34, 44–45. 
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what exists in the United States.119 This has resulted in a Chi-
nese securities market that has been described as “notoriously 
corrupt and ‘casinolike [sic].’”120 The primary government regu-
lator in China is its equivalent of the SEC,121 the China Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”). 122  The powers of the 
CSRC are delineated in the Securities Law of the People’s Re-
public of China (“Chinese Securities Laws”),123 which sets forth 
the regulatory regime for both initial and subsequent offerings 
of securities by Chinese companies.124 The CSRC’s basic func-
tions, similar to the SEC, include general supervisory powers 
over the securities markets;125 verification, examination, and 
approval of public offerings of securities;126 and, notably, “su-
pervis[ing] the securities market behaviors of the listed compa-
                                                                                                                                     
 119. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484. China adopted its first national 
securities law on December 29, 1998. Id. The Securities Law of the People’s 
Republic of China took effect on July 1, 1999. Id. The law has subsequently 
been amended, most recently in October 2005. Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, 
China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and Assess-
ment, 19 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 229, 229 (2008). The revisions took effect on Jan-
uary 1, 2006. See id. See also Finn, supra note 12, at 286 (“The relative im-
maturity of China’s legal system poses a number of obstacles to its effective-
ness.”). 
 120. Dina Jie Yin, Note, Investor Regulations: An American Answer to a 
Chinese Problem, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 397, 412 (2004) (quoting Kevin Hamlin, 
China’s Iron Lady: Premier Zhu Rongji Hired Laura Cha To Rein in China’s 
Casinolike Stock Markets. Critics Say She’s Hurting the Economy—But She’s 
Not Backing Down, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (INT’L ED.), Vol. 27, Issue 5, May 
1, 2002). 
 121. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484 (discussing how the CSRC, a regu-
latory body “subordinate to the State Council,” is similar to the United States 
scheme, in which the SEC is “subordinate to the executive branch.”). In addi-
tion, the CSRC draws its regulatory authority by a grant from the legislature 
through their promulgation of the Chinese Securities Laws. Id. at 485. Simi-
larly, the SEC was created through Congressional passage of the Exchange 
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
 122. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 484. 
 123. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [ZHENGQUAN FA] 
[Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Stand-
ing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, amend-
ed Aug. 28, 2004 and Oct. 27, 2005), art. 166–74 (China), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/laws/rfdm/statelaws/200904/t20090429_1
02757.htm. 
 124. See id. art. 10–77 (China). 
 125. See id. art. 166 (China). 
 126. See id. art. 10, 167(5) (China). 
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nies and their shareholders who shall fulfill the relevant obli-
gations according to the relevant laws and regulations.”127 
As under the Securities Act in the United States, the regis-
tration of new securities in China must be accompanied by le-
gal, accounting, and financial reports. 128  Similar to the Ex-
change Act in the United States, public companies in China 
must file periodic reports with the CSRC disclosing their finan-
cial condition and performance.129 However, there is no inde-
pendent accounting oversight body similar to the PCAOB in 
China.130 Therefore, the responsibility to police companies’ dis-
closures and enforce the submission of accurately audited fi-
nancial statements rests with the CSRC alone.131 
Structurally, the CSRC is an institution within the State 
Council, China’s most powerful executive body.132 Some have 
                                                                                                                                     
 127. China Securities and Regulatory Commission, CHINA SEC. REG. 
COMMISSION, http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/who/intro (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2012). Further, the CSRC’s mandate states that the body will “regu-
late, according to law, the securities business activities of . . . those law firms, 
public accounting firms and asset appraisal organizations that are engaged in 
securities business.” ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 167(3) (China). 
 128. ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 58 (China). 
 129. See id. art. 60–62 (China). However, while the Exchange Act requires 
annual, quarterly, and current reports, the Chinese Securities Laws require 
annual reports, “interim” reports every six months, and “ad hoc” reports upon 
certain triggering events. 15 U.S.C. § 78m; ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 60–62 (Chi-
na). 
 130. See Andrea Shalal-Esa & Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: Justice Depart-
ment Probing Chinese Accounting, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-china-usa-accounting-
idUSTRE78S3QM20110929 (quoting Robert Khuzami, Director of Enforce-
ment at the SEC, that inadequate accounting and audit review in China is “a 
big issue” and “not acceptable”). Interestingly, the Chinese constitution does 
contemplate accounting oversight, as evidenced by the constitution’s estab-
lishment, within the State Council, of an Auditor-General position that over-
sees an independent auditing body. XIANFA art. 86, 91 (1982) (China). How-
ever, the auditing body’s jurisdiction is limited to regulating the “auditing [of] 
revenue and expenditure of departments under the State Council” and local 
municipalities. Id. art. 91, § 3 (China). This limited jurisdiction of the Audi-
tor-General is further clarified in the Chinese Securities Laws, which de-
scribe the Auditor-General’s authority over “stock exchanges, securities com-
panies, securities registration and clearing institutions and the securities 
regulatory authority.” ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 9 (China). 
 131. See ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 65 (China). 
 132. Id. art. 7 (China). The State Council is “the executive body of the high-
est organ of state power[ and] the highest organ of state administration.” 
XIANFA art. 85 (China). The membership of the State Council consists of the 
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recognized this lack of independence as being problematic for 
enforcement purposes.133 A survey of mature economies shows 
that the chief regulatory body is typically structured inde-
pendently to ensure enforcement efficacy.134 In China, though, 
the government has dual interests, only one of which is regula-
tion.135 Since the CPC still has a large presence in some indus-
tries that were deemed off-limits to the “limited privatization” 
movement, the government remains a dominant shareholder in 
many companies.136 The CSRC, as a State Council agency, is 
therefore placed in the position of regulating a securities mar-
ket in which the government is a significant participant.137 It is 
not difficult to imagine situations where the government “en-
courages” the CSRC to back off of a regulatory enforcement ac-
                                                                                                                                     
Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councilors, State Ministers, the Auditor-
General, and the Secretary-General. Id. The State Council can be compared 
to the executive branch of the U.S. government. See K.C. FUNG ET AL., U.S. 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA 37 (2006) (commenting that “the State Council . 
. . represents the executive branch.”). The State Council “carr[ies] out the 
principles and policies of the [CPC] as well as the regulations and laws 
adopted by the [National People’s Congress], and dealing with such affairs as 
China’s internal politics, diplomacy, national defense, finance, economy, cul-
ture and education.” The State Council, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/statecouncil.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2012). 
 133. HUI HUANG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: INSIDER TRADING 
LAW IN CHINA 86 (2006). 
 134. Id. (citing the SEC in the United States, the FSA in the United King-
dom, and the ASIC in Australia as three examples of regulator independ-
ence). “It goes without saying in developed securities markets that a securi-
ties regulatory body should be structured independently to enable it to effec-
tively carry out its regulatory role.” Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Ramey, supra note 18, at 464; Carew, supra note 31. The state 
shows no sign of relinquishing control of certain sectors, such as “national 
securities-related industries, natural monopolies, sectors providing important 
goods and services to the public, and important enterprises in pillar indus-
tries and the high-technology sector.” Donald C. Clarke, Law Without Order 
in Chinese Corporate Governance Institutions, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 131, 
144 (2010). 
 137. HUANG, supra note 133, at 86 (estimating that state-owned shares 
make up about two-thirds of all shares on the market). Further, the CSRC’s 
main enforcement tool is referral to the judiciary. See ZHENGQUAN FA, art. 
173 (China). The judiciary branch in China is equally conflicted with respect 
to the CPC and government interests. See Clarke, supra note 136, at 182. 
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tion against a company illicitly making large profits where the 
CPC is the controlling shareholder.138 
Conflicts of interest aside, the enforcement power of the 
CSRC is rather limited.139 There is evidence that the agency 
has trouble securing funding and retaining talent.140 For one 
example, the CSRC employs only 1,465 staff despite China’s 
enormous population. 141  The agency’s powers to investigate 
companies and collect evidence are therefore limited.142 To pro-
vide a second example of the CSRC’s weak legitimacy, Chinese 
courts often do not cooperate with the agency’s requests to 
freeze corporate assets. 143  The passive judicial response to 
CSRC inquiries is partially due to the fact that Chinese judges 
are the appointees of local political authorities.144 Yet there is 
also a procedural element involved, as Chinese plaintiffs must 
file suit in the defendant’s domicile.145 A corporate defendant is 
likely either controlled by the local government or, if the com-
pany has been privatized under the 1978 reforms, by locally 
influential executives.146 The local government and court offi-
cials may have an interest in the company’s performance.147 
Therefore, due to locality interests, these courts are satisfied to 
allow a local company to continue operating without regulatory 
interference.148 In sum, while the CSRC ostensibly appears to 
mirror the SEC’s goals and regulations, the agency is largely 
                                                                                                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 136, at 180. 
If the securities markets are not paying good money for issues of 
[state-owned enterprises’] stock, then the CSRC is not doing its job, 
and if clamping down on abuses would hurt the markets—for exam-
ple, by obstructing the flow of funds into the market from illegal 
sources—then the CSRC may not have the political will to do so. 
Id. 
 139. See HUANG, supra note 133, at 84–86. 
 140. See id. at 84–85 (explaining that many Chinese view the CSRC has a 
training ground for private sector financial employment). 
 141. Id. at 84. 
 142. Id. at 86. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Clarke, supra note 136, at 182. In addition to corruption and vulnera-
bility to political pressure, Chinese judges tend to have a low level of educa-
tion. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
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ineffective in enforcing the Chinese Securities Laws, thereby 
allowing investors and companies to pursue potentially fraudu-
lent activity without fear of penalty.149 
One theory as to China’s lack of effective oversight blames 
the relative youth of the Chinese securities industry.150 While 
the American regulatory regime arose in response to the Great 
Depression,151 China has attempted to develop securities regu-
lation in a time of prosperity.152 Its regulatory bodies, which 
oversee the banking and insurance industries, predate the 
growth of China’s banks into some of the largest in the 
world.153 Further, although the CSRC has been creating new 
regulations quickly,154 it is too understaffed to enforce its own 
laws.155 The current Chinese securities market consists of ap-
proximately 1,200 Chinese public reporting companies issuing 
securities to a market of 1.3 billion people.156  Nevertheless, 
China does in fact have largely similar regulations to those 
found in Western economies.157 Therefore, some academics con-
                                                                                                                                     
 149. See Markets in China, supra note 14. 
 150. From 1989 to October 2002, China went from having no securities 
market to a securities market with over 1,200 publicly listed companies. 
These companies collectively constituted a market capitalization of 4.27 tril-
lion yuan ($514.3 billion). Ji Chen & Stephen C. Thomas, The Ups and Downs 
of the PRC Securities Market, 30 CHINA BUS. REV. 36, 36 (2003). 
 151. Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 97 (reciting that, in the 
United States, Congress enacted the federal securities laws in response to the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and tasked the SEC to administer them). The 
United States has a history of reactionary financial regulatory legislation 
beyond just the federal securities laws in the 1930s. The technology boom of 
the 1960s involving Xerox, IBM, and Polaroid led to the passage of the Wil-
liams Act (regulating corporate takeovers), ERISA (regulating employee ben-
efit plans), the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (amending existing antitrust law), and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (providing for further accounting transpar-
ency), all in the 1970s. DeLaMater, supra note 82, at 115. 
 152. Yin, supra note 120, at 409. 
 153. Dinny McMahon & Aaron Back, Resignations Suggest Shift for China’s 
Banks, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577003734190522
426.html. Despite China’s position as the world’s second largest economy, the 
financial sector remains underdeveloped and regulators face major challeng-
es. Id. 
 154. Yin, supra note 120, at 415. 
 155. See Chen & Thomas, supra note 150, at 39. 
 156. Id.; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 3. 
 157. Yin, supra note 120, at 412–13. China looked to the Western regulato-
ry structure for guidance when drafting the CSRC’s mandate. Id. In a sur-
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tend that the source of problems found in Chinese companies is 
management, not government.158 Due to the overwhelmingly 
centralized state of the Chinese economy a generation ago, 
these scholars argue, many Chinese falsely disclose infor-
mation, manipulate markets, and trade on inside information 
due to their lack of experience with capitalism.159 
Putting aside the unlikely explanation of a cultural propensi-
ty towards deceitful behavior, the principal difference between 
the Chinese and American financial regulatory systems re-
mains the principal regulator’s willingness to pursue enforce-
ment and independent accounting oversight of companies.160 
An examination of case studies confirms that accounting irreg-
ularities, as well as revelations of outright fraud, are frequent-
ly to blame for the underperformance of the many Chinese for-
eign private issuers listing in the United States via reverse 
mergers. 
B. The Underperformance of Reverse Merger Listings 
As discussed above, many Chinese small businesses that 
have sought to access American capital markets have done so 
through a reverse merger with an existing American shell 
company and subsequently listing either on an exchange, such 
as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) or the NASDAQ, or 
on the over-the-counter (“OTC”) bulletin board system.161 Since 
                                                                                                                                     
prising move, Premier Zhu Rongji recruited a Shanghai-born, U.S.-educated 
woman to be Vice Chairperson of the CSRC. Some observers see this as an 
attempt to “fall in line with Western securities regulation standards.” Id. For 
a comparison of United States and Chinese securities regulation, see supra 
notes 100–160 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 414; Finn, supra note 12, at 287. 
 159. See Yin, supra note 120, at 414 (noting “lack of experience in capital-
istic economic policies” as a factor in regulatory problems plaguing China). 
See also Finn, supra note 12, at 287 (describing a “cultural grounds for ac-
ceptance of bribery” and frequent corruption). Finn draws a connection be-
tween corruption and the emergence of the post-1978 Chinese economy. Id. 
Further, he states that “corruption has an adverse effect on foreigners doing 
business in China.” Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Robert Holmes, China Reverse-Merger Regulation Looks 
Flawed, CNBC (Dec. 23, 2010, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/40787567/China_Reverse_Merger_Regulation_Looks_
Flawed. 
 161. Anderlini, supra note 89. Public companies which are not listed on an 
exchange trade in the OTC market, a “securities quotation and trading sys-
tem for broker-dealers.” Pavkov, supra note 90, at 508, 510–11. The OTC 
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the goal of the Chinese company conducting a reverse merger is 
to find an easy means to access the American public markets, 
rather than the traditional merger motivation of finding a stra-
tegic partner, many of the reverse merger deals have involved 
odd corporate combinations.162 For example, Winner Group, a 
Chinese medical-device retailer, merged into the shell of Las 
Vegas Resorts.163 Zhongsen International, a tire manufacturer, 
likewise merged into the American shell of Rub A Dub Soap.164 
Chinese foreign private issuers that have pursued this sort of 
“backdoor listing” are not subject to SEC review or reporting, 
nor are they subject to the rules and regulations issued by the 
individual exchanges on which they list their securities.165 
Despite Western enthusiasm over the wondrous growth in 
China, many of the Chinese companies listing via reverse mer-
ger have underperformed.166 A Barron’s study of 158 Chinese 
foreign private issuers in the United States shows that the me-
dian among them underperformed the benchmark Halter USX 
CHINA Index by 75% and the Russell 2000 small-cap stock in-
dex by 66%.167 The American investor seeking to invest in the 
Chinese small-business boom and the Chinese entrepreneur 
seeking American growth capital bore the brunt of these loss-
es.168 
                                                                                                                                     
marketplace does not have the trading floor of an exchange. Id. at 508 (ex-
plaining that securities in the OTC marketplace are traded by dealers known 
as “marketmakers.”). The OTC marketplace is particularly popular with Chi-
nese foreign private issuers due to its lower standards for review and approv-
al. Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, supra note 92. See also 
Pavkov, supra note 90, at 511 (describing the OTC bulletin board system and 
the Pink Sheets as the “wild west of stock markets.”). The OTC marketplace 
requires only that companies are current in their Exchange Act filings and 
are not listed concurrently on any national securities exchange. Id. By con-
trast, the NYSE has the most stringent listing standards and often delists 
companies that “significantly reduc[e] operating assets or scope of operations 
and companies entering bankruptcy or liquidation.” Id. at 508. This makes 
the NYSE a less popular venue for Chinese reverse mergers. See id. (explain-
ing that public shells are deterred from remaining on the NYSE). 
 162. See Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Double Due Diligence Efforts Before Investing, supra note 92. 
 166. See, e.g., Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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The group of Chinese foreign private issuers listing via re-
verse merger has been described as a “minefield”169 of disap-
pointment, often caused directly by accounting irregularities 
and fraud.170 Examples of failed listings of this nature began 
almost as soon as the first Chinese companies came to market. 
Perhaps the most notable early case occurred in September 
1997 when Asia Electronics Holding Company, a TV compo-
nent manufacturer, raised forty-two million dollars on the 
NASDAQ before going “into a tailspin” following the arrest of 
its leader for “fraudulent investment schemes.”171 The scandal 
proved to be merely the tip of the iceberg, however, and the full 
scale of corporate fraud within Chinese foreign private issuers 
continues to emerge to this day. 
C. Recent Cases of Corporate Fraud and Accounting Irregulari-
ties 
Chinese small businesses listing in the United States via re-
verse mergers engage in fraudulent accounting in China in or-
der to attract growth-focused American investors.172 One of the 
most-cited examples of this occurred in 2006 with China Expert 
Technology, whose audited financial statements showed $175 
million in revenue over four years. 173  Regulators discovered 
that the company was a sham, with no revenue and few, if any, 
customers.174 
                                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. Even large-cap stocks listing on the NYSE have been implicated. 
The largest IPO of 2003, China Life Insurance, was quickly subject to a 
shareholders’ derivative action due to accounting discrepancies. Finn, supra 
note 12, at 287–88. 
 170. Anderlini, supra note 89. 
 171. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Asia Electronics was one of the first 
Chinese listings on the NASDAQ. Id. Today, the NASDAQ is the most popu-
lar venue for Chinese foreign private issuers, with 159 China-based compa-
nies on the exchange. Holmes, supra note 160. 
 172. Many of these companies keep two sets of books: one for the Chinese 
regulators and one for SEC examination. Holmes, supra note 160. For exam-
ple, NYSE Euronext-listed China Green Agriculture, a fertilizer manufactur-
er, was alleged to have reported one set of sales and net income figures to the 
SEC and a different set to the Chinese government. Id. The company’s stock 
proceeded to lose 35% of its value after it admitted to the veracity of the 
claims. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. The company was later subject to a class action suit brought by its 
shareholders, who won a default judgment against China Expert Technology. 
Id. The company, however, was entirely judgment-proof. Id. 
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The vast scale of accounting scandals in Chinese foreign pri-
vate issuers listing via reverse merger came to light in the 
spring and summer of 2011. Between March and May of that 
year, more than 24 Chinese foreign private issuers disclosed 
auditor resignations or accounting problems, such as the inabil-
ity to confirm balance sheet figures.175 In June 2011, Orient 
Paper, a cardboard manufacturer and NYSE Euronext-listed 
Chinese company, lost two-thirds of its market capitalization 
after analysts visited its factory and discovered it to be “idle 
and dilapidated.” 176  The analysts, employed by Hong Kong-
based Muddy Waters Research (“Muddy Waters”)—which has 
built a reputation for being bearish on Chinese small-cap 
stocks177—estimated that Orient Paper overstated the value of 
                                                                                                                                     
All the assets are in China. The people are in China. [One] can’t so 
much as serve a subpoena in China . . . . You can’t get any discovery 
in China. The SEC would be completely blocked from any regulatory 
action against a Chinese person or entity. What can they do? Noth-
ing. 
Id. (quoting Laurence Rosen, an attorney who represents disgruntled share-
holders of China Expert Technology). 
 175. Bill Alpert, SEC Reports on China Reverse-Mergers, BARRON’S (May 5, 
2011), 
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970203390704576305100837
510830.html. 
 176. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Carson C. Block, founder of invest-
ment firm Muddy Waters Research, describes Orient Paper’s headquarters as 
a “Potemkin Village, littered with ‘junk machinery’ and ‘trash.’” David Barbo-
za & Azam Ahmed, Muddy Waters Research Is a Thorn to Some Chinese 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011, 9:20 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/muddy-waters-research-is-a-thorn-to-
some-chinese-companies. Block describes a pile of scrap cardboard that the 
analysts found on the Orient Paper site, which the company had listed on 
their balance sheet as “raw material” worth millions of dollars. Id. 
 177. Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176. The firm’s name is derived from a 
Chinese proverb that says that “the easiest way to catch fish is by muddying 
the water, forcing it to the surface.” Id. “Muddy Waters . . . [is] taking direct 
aim at reverse mergers [it] say[s] have dubious practices. The organization 
[is] issuing research reports, posting surveillance videos and collecting corpo-
rate documents.” Id. “Small-cap” is shorthand for companies with a small 
market capitalization, generally considered to be between $300 million and 
$2 billion. Small Cap Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 
2012). 
2012] FUND. ENTREPREN'L VENTURES IN CHINA 399 
its assets by ten-fold and revenues by forty-fold in the course of 
its SEC disclosure.178 
That same month, the SEC halted trading and sought a 
“stop-order” to cancel the effectiveness of the registration 
statements of China Intelligent Lighting and Electronics Inc. 
and China Century Dragon Media Inc.179 The SEC alleged that 
each company had failed to publicly disclose that their auditors 
had resigned after questioning the accuracy of each company’s 
financial statements and bank records. 180  Similarly, China-
based RINO International, a sewer equipment manufacturer, 
was delisted by the NASDAQ181 after a short-seller uncovered 
accounting discrepancies involving customer contracts that had 
never been executed.182 RINO had gone through three auditors 
and four chief financial officers in four years.183 Shares lost 
two-thirds of their value before the stock was delisted.184 
Some of the premier institutional investors in the United 
States have suffered losses when otherwise attractive deals 
implode.185 The Carlyle Group, a private equity firm that has 
                                                                                                                                     
 178. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 179. Joshua Gallu, SEC Seeks Halt To Sales of 2 China-Based Stocks, 
BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-13/sec-
seeks-halt-to-sales-of-2-china-based-stocks.html. 
 180. Id. Resignation or dismissal of a company’s outside auditors requires 
disclosure through an 8-K filing with the SEC. PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 
86, at 163. 
 181. Each stock exchange registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act 
has the authority to set listing standings, which issues must meet in order to 
be listed on that exchange. Pavkov, supra note 90, at 508. The penalty for 
failure to meet an exchange’s listing standards is often “delisting,” or removal 
from the exchange. Id. Listing standards often include a required “number of 
shareholders, trading volume, number of publicly held shares, aggregate 
market value of shares outstanding, and total global market capitalization.” 
Id. The NYSE has the most stringent listing standards, and therefore Chi-
nese reverse mergers tend to occur on the regional exchanges and the OTC 
marketplace. Id. 
 182. Holmes, supra note 160. 
 183. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. The company also restated its finan-
cial results twice during that time period. Id. 
 184. Holmes, supra note 160. Investors in RINO lost $400 million. Id. 
 185. See Robert Cookson & Henny Sender, Carlyle Faces Questions over 
China Investments, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 2011, 8:03 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7971bb26-773e-11e0-aed6-00144feabdc0.html (de-
scribing The Carlyle Group’s problems with its Chinese investments). See 
also Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176 (stating that Paulson & Company, 
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about $153 billion under management,186 bought a 22 percent 
ownership interest in China Agritech, a NASDAQ-listed ferti-
lizer manufacturer that came to the market in 2005 via a re-
verse merger. 187  Yet as of mid-2012, China Agritech faces 
delisting from the exchange for failing to file its account on 
time188 and the company has gone through three auditors in 
three years.189 Such examples demonstrate that the failures 
seen in Chinese small-cap stocks are indicative of systemic 
problems with regulation and oversight in China, and are not 
due to inadequate due diligence on the part of the investor. 
A significant dimension to the reversal merger scandals is 
the fact that most of the activities have initially come to light 
as a result of short-sellers’ independent research, only to be fol-
lowed by regulatory investigations.190 Muddy Waters, one of the 
more high profile Chinese foreign private issuer short-
sellers,191 views its role as filing a gap in regulatory oversight 
between the United States and China.192 RINO and China Me-
dia Express were each delisted after Muddy Waters accused 
them of fraudulent activities.193 Similarly, regulators suspend-
ed Duoyuan Global Water after Muddy Waters made accusa-
tions of fraud against them.194 At Duoyuan, four of its six inde-
pendent directors resigned after claiming the company’s man-
agement was obstructing its investigation into the corporation’s 
internal controls and accounting.195 
Muddy Waters also targeted a forestry company named Sino-
Forest, a company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange196 that 
                                                                                                                                     
John A. Paulson’s hedge fund, lost billions of dollars after the collapse of Si-
no-Forest). 
 186. The Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sept. 6, 
2011), available at 
http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000095012311082561/w83442sv1.
htm. 
 187. Cookson & Sender, supra note 185. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 176. 
 191. See generally id. 
 192. See id. Muddy Waters describes itself as “regulat[ing] in an area with 
little oversight.” Id. 
 193. Anderlini, supra note 89. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. Although Sino-Forest is not traded on a U.S. exchange, it is other-
wise an apt case study of the issues and contentions raised in this Note. 
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has become the poster-child for Chinese accounting fraud.197 
On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters released a research report198 
alleging that the company was a Ponzi scheme199 in the range 
of $900 million.200 The essence of the claim by Muddy Waters 
was that Sino-Forest vastly overstated its forestry holdings in 
China.201 The stock slumped from a high of C$25.30 ($24.63) 
per share in March 2011 to a low of C$1.99 ($1.94) following 
the release of the Muddy Waters report.202 Trading of the stock 
was thereafter halted by the Toronto Stock Exchange.203 Bil-
lions of dollars’ worth of investment funds have been lost as a 
result of this series of Chinese reverse merger frauds, and the 
situation continues to unfold as of this writing.204 
                                                                                                                                     
 197. Kaitlin Shung, Sino-Forest Sees Paulson & Co Sell Out As Fraud Alle-
gations Linger, CHINA BRIEFING (June 21, 2011), http://www.china-
briefing.com/news/2011/06/21/sino-forest-sees-paulson-co-sell-out-as-
fraudulent-reporting-allegations-linger.html. 
 198. Anderlini, supra note 89. 
 199. A “Ponzi scheme” is “a fraudulent investing scam promising high rates 
of return with little risk to investors.” Ponzi Scheme Definition, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/ponzischeme.asp (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2012). 
The Ponzi scheme generates returns for older investors by acquiring 
new investors. This scam actually yields the promised returns to ear-
lier investors, as long as there are more new investors. These 
schemes usually collapse on themselves when the new investments 
stop. 
Id. 
 200. Craig Stephen, China’s U.S.-Listed Stocks Are Junk, MARKETWATCH 
(July 10, 2011, 10:48 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-us-
listed-stocks-are-junk-2011-07-10. 
 201. Ian Austen, Sino-Forest Report Rejects Fraud Claims, With Caveats, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/sino-forest-report-rejects-fraud-
claims-with-caveats. Sino-Forest operated through a series of fifty-eight hold-
ing companies located in the British Virgin Islands and used third-parties to 
act as middlemen. Id. Sino-Forest contended that “while unusual by Western 
standards, [this is] an accepted way of doing business in China.” Id. 
 202. Markets in China, supra note 14. 
 203. Austen, supra note 201. 
 204. Michael Rapoport, Sen. Schumer Urges Audit Watchdog to Act on Chi-
na, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203710704577052543850533
540.html. 
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D. The Regulatory Abyss 
Scandals within the Chinese small-cap sector have cost 
American investors approximately thirty-four billion dollars in 
losses over the past five years.205 In response, American ex-
changes are suspending a number of Chinese companies from 
trading while inquiries proceed.206 Separately, the SEC is halt-
ing the offering of shares by these companies as they investi-
gate claims of fraud against Chinese reverse merger listings. 
The contention amongst many American investors, however, is 
that these scandals should have never occurred in the first 
place.207 Aspects of corporate internal control such as the pro-
duction of accurate of financial statements and bank account 
balances, as well as the elimination of accounting discrepan-
cies, fit squarely within the realm of the auditors’, regulators’, 
and exchanges’ responsibilities as gatekeepers. 208  While the 
Chinese media contends that a few “bad apples” have tarnished 
the sector, U.S. securities experts maintain that it is a series of 
“fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory environment” sur-
rounding reverse mergers that is to blame.209 
Chinese foreign private issuers have fallen into a “regulatory 
vacuum” of market regulation.210 The principal U.S. securities 
regulator, the SEC, is too understaffed to review the heavy vol-
ume of reverse merger activity.211 Further, the SEC cannot en-
                                                                                                                                     
 205. Holmes, supra note 160. The majority of these losses occurred in Chi-
nese companies gaining access to the U.S. market through reverse mergers. 
Id. 
 206. See Cookson & Sender, supra note 185. “Of the 19 NASDAQ stocks 
currently suspended from trading, 15 are Chinese.” Id. 
 207. Holmes, supra note 160. 
 208. Some have argued that the Chinese lawyers, accountants, intermediar-
ies, and stock promoters who bring these companies to market are small and 
inexperienced, therefore neglecting to conduct sufficient due diligence or 
proper audits. Anderlini, supra note 89. Nevertheless, ignorance cannot be 
accepted as an excuse given the massive losses seen in the Chinese small-cap 
space. Pavlo, supra note 90 (opining that the failure of Chinese company 
management to learn American compliance requirements is no excuse for 
fraud). 
 209. Holmes, supra note 160. 
 210. Anderlini, supra note 89. 
 211. The SEC has “hundreds of deals to review [in the small-cap space], 
thousands of related financial statements, and no easy way to verify financial 
statements that relate to operations in China.” Holmes, supra note 160 (stat-
ing that even assigning the entire Enforcement division’s resources for two 
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force its regulations relating to the disclosure produced by 
these companies as the fraudulent activities have occurred in 
China, which lies outside of the SEC’s subpoena power.212 
The principal Chinese securities regulator, the CSRC, has no 
incentive to regulate shares of companies which are only 
bought and sold in the United States.213 The CSRC has chosen 
not to enforce its disclosure standards for Chinese businesses 
trading on American exchanges in spite of its direct obligation 
to do so—one of the CSRC’s codified functions is to “supervise 
the offering of securities outside of China by Chinese enterpris-
es.”214 In addition, despite the existence of a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the SEC and the CSRC that calls for 
enforcement cooperation between the two regulators, the CSRC 
has shown little willingness to collaborate.215 Even within its 
own jurisdiction, the CSRC rarely brings enforcement actions 
against those companies defrauding investors and clients 
through dodgy accounting practices.216 
One of the most surprising aspects of the reverse merger 
scandals is the extent to which the auditors of these troubled 
companies are U.S.-registered accounting firms. 217  Some of 
these auditors are small American firms that outsourced their 
                                                                                                                                     
years to Chinese foreign private issuer investigations would barely make a 
dent). 
 212. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. Some have suggested that Chinese 
small business owners are aware of this jurisdictional constraint on the SEC 
and have acted accordingly. Holmes, supra note 160. Because of the number 
of legal challenges that American regulators face internationally, some have 
termed the United States a “paper tiger.” Kara Scannell, Reverse Mergers 
Test U.S. Regulators, FIN. TIMES (July 4, 2011, 9:17 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18338c8e-a65c-11e0-ae9c-00144feabdc0.html. 
 213. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. 
 214. Friedman, supra note 16, at 483 (emphasis added). 
 215. Holmes, supra note 160. This Memorandum ostensibly served to “for-
malize a cooperative and consulting relationship” between the two regulators, 
particularly with respect to technical and enforcement assistance. SEC and 
China Securities Regulatory Commission Sign Memorandum of Understand-
ing to Formalize Cooperative Relationship, News Release No. 94-35, 1994 WL 
150804 (Apr. 28, 1994) [hereinafter SEC News Release]. The Memorandum of 
Understanding between the United States and China was originally signed in 
April 1994 and subsequently reaffirmed in May 2006. Holmes, supra note 
160. 
 216. Markets in China, supra note 14. 
 217. Anderlini, supra note 89 (stating that 74 percent of Chinese reverse 
merger companies were audited by U.S. firms). 
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audit work to local firms in China.218 However, several Big 
Four219  American accounting firms have also been implicat-
ed.220 In May 2011, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (“Deloitte”) re-
signed as auditor for Longtop Financial Technologies 
(“Longtop”), a Chinese financial software company with $1.1 
billion in stock market value.221 In a letter filed publicly with 
the SEC, Deloitte explained that upon seeking confirmation of 
bank account balances, Deloitte auditors were harassed by 
company management, who “threat[ened] to stop [staff] from 
leaving the company premises unless [the staff] allowed the 
company to retain [Deloitte’s] audit files.” 222  These threats 
came after Deloitte had discovered that Longtop did not have 
any of the money that they had claimed in their books. 223 
Shortly after Deloitte’s letter was filed, Longtop’s stock was 
suspended from the NYSE and is now considered worthless.224 
The fraud at Longtop is noteworthy because of the size of the 
company and the fact that Chinese banks were allegedly 
providing Deloitte with false bank statements supporting 
Longtop’s inaccurate disclosures.225 
                                                                                                                                     
 218. Id. 
 219. The “Big Four” public accounting firms in the United States are 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers. Big Four Public Accounting Firms, ABOUT.COM, 
http://financecareers.about.com/od/publicaccountingfirms/a/BigFour.htm (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2011). 
 220. For example, China Media Express’s auditor, Deloitte, quit when the 
accounting firm determined that they could “no longer . . . rely on the repre-
sentations of [China Media Express] management.” Pavlo, supra note 90. In 
addition, both Sino-Forest and China Agritech had used Big Four firm Ernst 
& Young as their auditor. Floyd Norris, Troubled Audit Opinions, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/business/10norris.html?_r=1; James 
Sterngold, Wall Street Scion Lost in China Agritech As Shorts Cry ‘Scam’, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
04-26/wall-street-scion-lost-in-china-agritech-as-shorts-cry-scam-.html. 
 221. Norris, supra note 92. Deloitte had signed off on Longtop’s financial 
statements for six years prior to their resignation. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (“Longtop’s chairman, Jia Xiao Gong, told a Deloitte partner that 
there was ‘fake cash recorded on the books because there had been ‘fake rev-
enue in the past.’”). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. (“Just what, if anything, Chinese officials choose to do could provide 
an indication about whether defrauding foreign investors is deemed a serious 
crime in China.”). 
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The Longtop scandal exploded into a global episode of finger-
pointing between the United States and China.226 Deloitte now 
finds itself in an uncomfortable bind between foreign regula-
tors.227 Upon the revelation of the Longtop scandal, the SEC 
asked Deloitte’s Shanghai office to produce its audit papers.228 
The firm declined, stating that such production would place it 
afoul of Chinese secrecy laws.229  In October 2011, the SEC 
brought suit against Deloitte, seeking an administrative sub-
poena.230 Should Deloitte ignore the subpoena, they will face a 
criminal conviction for noncompliance.231 Chinese regulators, 
however, are preventing Deloitte’s Shanghai office from disclos-
ing the information requested.232 The PCAOB has also become 
embroiled in the mess, threatening to revoke Deloitte’s regis-
tration.233 
The PCAOB, established to police accounting firms engaging 
in poor gatekeeping of the exact type that has been occurring in 
the Chinese reverse merger space, has been powerless to flex 
its muscles as China will not let the PCAOB inspect local audi-
tors engaged by American listed companies.234 In a comment 
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work papers. 
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2011, 2:03 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/shhh-dont-
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 229. Henning, supra note 227. 
 230. Norris, supra note 228. 
 231. Henning, supra note 227. 
 232. Pentland, supra note 15. “Deloitte China issued a press release stating: 
‘As a matter of national sovereignty, the law of the People’s Republic of China 
precludes our firm from producing the requested documents to a foreign regu-
lator without approval from [the CSRC].’” Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Alpert & Norton, supra note 84. This includes the Chinese affiliates of 
American Big Four firms. Norris, supra note 92. James Doty, chairman of the 
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letter sent to the SEC in May 2009, the CSRC stated that the 
PCAOB should “fully rely on the work of the CSRC.”235 Fur-
ther, the Chinese government has expressed its disagreement 
with the PCAOB’s “unilateral basis” for foreign inspections,236 
citing sovereignty concerns. 237  As the scandals surrounding 
Chinese reverse merger companies escalated in the summer 
and fall of 2011, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) sent a 
letter to the PCAOB urging them to exert their enforcement 
authority to bar any Chinese accounting firms that are not sub-
ject to PCAOB inspection from performing audit work on Chi-
nese companies listed in the United States.238 “This standoff,” 
Senator Schumer wrote, “has gone on long enough.”239 
The SEC/PCAOB and the CSRC have come to a standstill, 
with each side waiting for the other to blink. Given the magni-
tude of the current crisis of confidence in the audits of Chinese 
foreign private issuers, initiative needs to be taken that goes 
beyond the exchange of letters and bypasses the use of diplo-
matic summits that may be futile, costly, and time-consuming. 
IV. PROPOSALS TO REGULATE CHINESE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
ISSUERS 
It is imperative that there be a regulatory framework that 
will allow Chinese companies to access the U.S. capital mar-
kets while assuring American investors that the issuer is 
transparent and fully honest in its disclosures. Further, any 
regulatory framework must be enforceable, an aspect that the 
Chinese have forgone in the past.240 As word of the troubles in 
                                                                                                                                     
PCAOB, has termed this “a gaping hole in investor protection.” Michael 
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 237. Rapoport, supra note 204. 
 238. Id. “The board’s failure to do what it was created to do—particularly in 
the face of Chinese corporate accounting scandals that have already cost U.S. 
investors billions—is deeply troubling.” Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Markets in China, supra note 14 (“Reports of prosecutions in China 
over dodgy accounting in cases where investors or clients are victims remain 
scarce.”). See also David A. Caragliano, Note, Administrative Governance As 
Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation for the Growth of China’s Stock 
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the Chinese small-cap space spreads, and without any new 
regulatory schemes, American investors will inevitably be driv-
en away from the market.241 The losers, in the end, will be the 
many legitimate Chinese entrepreneurs who are deprived of 
fundraising opportunities abroad as well as international in-
vestors pursuing a growth-oriented investment strategy.242 
The instinctive reaction is to suggest that American regula-
tors enact an outright prohibition on reverse mergers. Howev-
er, this proposal is not prudent. The reverse merger technique, 
effectuated properly, can provide benefits to both the company 
and investors.243 Small-cap, private companies have special fi-
nancing needs that reverse mergers may be able to effectu-
ate.244 For example, reverse mergers allow smaller companies 
to access new capital and to promote themselves to new inves-
tors in the public markets.245 Investors benefit from reverse 
mergers by gaining access to “embryonic companies with high 
growth potential.”246 Such access is typically only available to 
venture capital firms and their respective investors. 247  Alt-
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Pavkov, supra note 90, at 489. Further, small businesses have difficulty pur-
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underwrite their securities. Id. This is attributable to the fact that invest-
ment bankers prefer to underwrite lower-risk companies. Id. Therefore, “non-
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hough substantial due diligence may be required, retail inves-
tors should not be impeded from pursuing a growth investment 
strategy through investment in reverse merger companies.248 
There is a better course than prohibiting reverse merger 
transactions. The essence of an improved regulatory framework 
capable of confronting these challenges is a stronger regulation 
of the accounting firms that have certified these troubled com-
panies. The extent to which the “reputational intermediaries” 
or gatekeepers, on whom investors have traditionally relied to 
verify disclosure, have participated in the frauds is troubling.249 
Since PCAOB-led examinations of the audits of Chinese foreign 
private issuers are being frustrated by the Chinese govern-
ment, the answer must come from within China’s borders. 
Simply put, if the Chinese will not allow the American regula-
tors to properly execute their mandate, then the burden should 
be on the Chinese to oversee those Chinese accountancy firms 
that are signing off on the audits of companies listing on Amer-
ican exchanges. The first step towards effective regulation of 
these listings is the creation, by the Chinese government, of an 
organic independent auditing oversight body that will internal-
ly regulate Chinese gatekeepers. The creation of the PCAOB 
through the passage of SOX in the United States could provide 
a template for the Chinese establishment of a new counterpart 
to the PCAOB. Such an organization would ideally work with 
the PCAOB to set international standards. 
An independent auditing oversight body in China is needed 
because China’s accounting firms themselves are failing inves-
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Id. China is a very promising market, but effort is required to find invest-
ments of true value. Id. 
 249. Caragliano, supra note 240, at 1311. Dan David, vice president at 
GeoInvesting, another Chinese small-cap short-seller, stated: “We had count-
ed on the fee collectors—the investment banks, the accountants and the law-
yers—to tell us what was right . . . . Now, we’re doing our own due diligence, 
and hiring people in China to investigate.” Barboza & Ahmed, supra note 
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tors in their capacities as gatekeepers.250 China’s accounting 
firms bear few, if any, penalties for their failure to produce ac-
curate financial reports.251 In addition, the CSRC has shown a 
“general unwillingness to enforce its standards in its core com-
petence of securities regulation.”252 The lack of regulation and 
enforcement by the CSRC is in direct opposition to its mission 
of “supervis[ing] the offering of securities outside of China by 
Chinese enterprises.” 253  The CSRC’s nonfeasance also runs 
against its commitment to work with the American regulators 
in the area of “technical and enforcement assistance.”254 It ap-
pears inevitable that any oversight of auditing, which relies on 
the CSRC for implementation and enforcement, “may not turn 
out to be terribly meaningful” to Chinese companies listing in 
the United States.255 
Opponents to the creation of such an organization, however, 
will argue that the implementation of SOX-like legislation 
abroad is unwarranted because SOX unfairly burdens foreign 
private issuers.256 On a general level, SOX has been challenged 
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on the grounds that its initiatives conflict with other nations’ 
local regulatory practices.257 Specifically with respect to foreign 
private issuers, SOX opponents contend that the compliance 
costs required are prohibitive for smaller companies.258 There is 
evidence that some foreign private issuers exited the American 
market following the passage of SOX and that the legislation 
caused other foreign companies to opt not to list in the United 
States.259 While SOX remains controversial as applied to for-
eign private issuers, it has resulted in the creation of an en-
forcement and regulatory body for auditing firms, the PCAOB, 
a necessary evil in an industry that has proven to be incapable 
of self-regulation.260 If China continues to cite sovereignty con-
cerns as the basis for barring PCAOB inspections within its 
borders,261 then the best solution is the creation by China of an 
independent body similar to the PCAOB to regulate its audit-
ing firms. 
This proposed regulatory structure has already proven suc-
cessful in the United States. The PCAOB has worked effective-
ly as a regulator of gatekeepers because SOX provided for 
stringent enforcement of the increased regulation, which is 
something the current Chinese regime refuses to do.262 To pro-
vide one important example, SOX and the PCAOB make indi-
viduals personally accountable for the accuracy of financial dis-
closures.263 Corporate officers are subject to severe civil or even 
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 259. Woo, supra note 256, at 144. 
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Andersen scandal, the accounting profession in the United States was subject 
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criminal liability for inaccurate financial statements.264 Finan-
cial statement certifications are required to accompany every 
annual and quarterly report filed in accordance with the Ex-
change Act.265 Officers are also required to certify their compa-
ny’s internal control structure.266 A separate certification must 
be made by the auditor to “attest to, and report on, the assess-
ment made by the management of the issuer . . . in accordance 
with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted 
by the [PCAOB].”267 These initiatives have proved successful in 
reinstituting integrity into American financial reporting.268 If 
the Chinese are willing to implement the certification require-
ments of SOX and an independent accounting oversight board 
similar to PCAOB, the plan could be effective in enforcing more 
stringent regulation of corporate officials and gatekeepers.269 
In addition, increased collaboration between the United 
States and China could supplement China’s creation of an ac-
counting oversight board and certification standards.270 To fos-
ter such collaboration, though, it will be necessary to update 
and utilize the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
SEC and the CSRC.271 The current version of the agreement 
dates to 1994 and needs to be revised to reflect actual proce-
dural and information-sharing initiatives between the two reg-
ulators.272 In July 2011, in a positive signal for future collabo-
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ration, a delegation of SEC and PCAOB officials met in Beijing 
with China’s Ministry of Finance and the CSRC.273 However, 
the Chinese cancelled a subsequent meeting scheduled to take 
place in Washington, D.C. in October 2011 and talks have since 
stalled.274 
The problems presented by poor auditing standards are 
threatening the financial stability of the small-cap market and 
demand redress. Implementation by China of an independent 
accounting oversight board and certification standards provid-
ing personal liability to corporate officers can help to regulate 
the audits coming out of China. The regulators on both sides of 
the Pacific, however, need to work together. The United States 
wants to protect its investors and China wants to ensure easy 
access to financing for its firms that wish to list abroad.275 An 
alliance between these two economic powers is necessary for 
investors to have faith in Chinese audits.276 
CONCLUSION 
The Chinese regulatory regime continues to be troubled by a 
“high degree of corruption and a low degree of transparency.”277 
The instances of accounting irregularities and corporate fraud 
that were uncovered in the summer and fall of 2011 highlight 
the problems China faces as it continues its assent as a global 
economic power. By refusing to properly enforce the production 
of accurate financial information by its companies listed 
abroad, and thwarting American efforts to do the same, China 
is hurting foreign investors, damaging the reputation of its 
economy and national character, and ultimately, hurting many 
of its own citizens who seek foreign capital to fund their new 
businesses. The SEC and the CSRC are currently at an im-
passe, harming each of their interests. The implementation of 
an independent accounting oversight board in China, along 
with more stringent certification requirements, will cause the 
Chinese to be more proactive in regulating gatekeepers and al-
low for investor confidence in the audits of Chinese foreign pri-
                                                                                                                                     
 273. Tammy Whitehouse, SEC, PCAOB Send Delegation to China, 
COMPLIANCE WK. (July 7, 2011), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-pcaob-
send-delegation-to-china/article/206996. 
 274. Rapoport, supra note 204. 
 275. Auditing in China, supra note 227. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Finn, supra note 12, at 315. 
2012] FUND. ENTREPREN'L VENTURES IN CHINA 413 
vate issuers. Finally, the U.S. and Chinese regulators need to 
work together to ensure that the fraudulent activities of Amer-
ican-listed Chinese issuers are eliminated, thereby ensuring a 
free and efficient flow of capital between the two nations. 
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